Publisher : Marine Policy
Place of publication :
Publication year : 2013
Thematic : Fisheries
Language :
Note
Allocation schemes are one way to combat the tragedy of the commons, the situation whereby individual users of a shared resource put their own interests above the collective good. In the case of shared fisheries, developing equitable and transparent allocation schemes can help to ensure stable cooperative management agreements, which in turn will facilitate sustainable fisheries. Allocation schemes for shared fisheries resources, which have been in existence for decades, have recently been facilitated by Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs). These schemes vary in the scale of interested parties, from simple two-country systems sharing Pacific salmon, to multi-country systems sharing Atlantic bluefin tuna. Most RFMOs tend to base allocation schemes on historical catch records, spatial stock abundance estimates, or a combination of these. Socio-economic factors do not appear to influence allocation to any major extent. Unfortunately, previous attempts at creating and enforcing allocation programs have not, by and large, been able to curb the serial depletion of fish stocks, particularly when the number of fishing countries is large. Several RFMOs are currently in the process of initiating or reformulating allocation programs. In this paper, current allocation approaches are reviewed and discussed in the context of their possible transference to new or evolving programs. Specifically, lessons from game theory are drawn on, and the potential for better incorporation of socio-economic circumstances in allocation decisions, which can incentivize improved compliance, is explored. The relevance of conclusions from the literature analyzing international water agreements is also discussed, and a combined socio-economic-ecological construct whereby allocation programs can be based on the sharing of benefits other than catch is proposed. ⺠Most Regional Fisheries Management Organizations base allocation on historical catches. ⺠Allocation plans have failed to conserve shared stocks, with catch overages being common. ⺠Socioeconomic drivers of fishing behaviour have largely been ignored. ⺠Rationality of cooperative agreements has thus not been fostered by allocation approaches. ⺠Allocation approaches should be expanded from allocating catches to allocating greater benefits.
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Keywords : elasmobranch
Encoded by : Pauline Carmel Joy Eje
